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Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights 
  
Richard A. Epstein* 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
 
From the earliest times, animals were understood as object of human 
rights. That result did not depend on some limited understanding of their 
capabilities for cognition and sensation, but rather rested on the strong sense that 
without domestication human beings could not secure their own advancement. 
The modern claims for animal rights cannot therefore be justified by an appeal to 
some newer and deeper understanding of the subject, but must rest on the claim 
that what they share with human beings is more important than what separates 
them. Those common elements do justify some level of animal protection but 
does not justify the radical transformation of social institutions that would flow 
from the recognition, as Steven Wise has advocated, of the basic libertarian rights 
of freedom from human domination and exploitation. 
 
 
 
Introduction: Two Conceptions of Animals 
One of the more persistent and impassioned struggles of our time is now 
being waged over the legal status of animals. Should they be treated as objects of 
human ownership, or as bearers of independent rights. Many modern writers, 
most notably Steven Wise and Gary Francione, have championed the latter 
position. In this paper I shall offer a tempered version of the original position 
that in the eyes of many will convict me of the new offense of specieism. In order 
to evaluate this choice, it is necessary to examine first the historical rules that 
comprised the law of animals in order to set the backdrop for the modern 
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 reforms. Part I of this article will set these out in brief compass. Its mission is to 
show that the historical accounts of animals did not rest on any fundamental 
misconception as to their capacities, but on the simple but powerful proposition 
that the survival and advancement of human civilization depended on the 
domestication and use of animals. Part II of this Article then explores the moral 
status of animals, and their relationship to women, children and slaves, under 
the traditional synthesis of legal rights. Part III then notes the benefits to animals 
that arise from the system of human ownership. Part IV relates these historical to 
the modern debates over the legal status of animals, and rejects the proposition 
that the creation of rights for animals is a logical extension of the creation of full 
rights for women and slaves. Part V discusses efforts to create animal rights 
based on their cognitive or sentient capacity, and concludes that these help 
justify many past initiatives for the protection of animals, but not the more 
aggressive claims for animal rights.  
I. Animals as Objects 
Under traditional conceptions of law, animals were typically regarded as 
objects of rights vested in their human owners but not as the holders of rights 
against human beings. Even as objects, animals historically occupied a large 
place in the overall system of legal rights and social relations. Animals in a 
bygone age represented a larger fraction of social wealth than they do today. As 
Jared Diamond reminds us, there were “many ways in which big domestic 
animals were crucial to those human societies possessing them. Most notably, 
they provided meat, milk products, fertilizer, land transport, leather, military 
assault vehicles, plow traction, and wool, as well as germs that killed previously 
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 unexposed people.”1 Smaller animals, such as birds were likewise domesticated 
for their “meat, egg and feathers.”2 
In order to frame the modern debate, it is useful to give some brief outline 
of the basic legal rights and duties among people over animals. These rules are 
subject to small but unimportant local variations over both time and place, 
largely on matters of detail and formality. The classical Biblical and Roman Law, 
however, applies in its original form today in both civil and common law 
countries, except where specific protective legislation intrudes.3 As with other 
objects of ownership, these rules are conveniently divided into three areas: 
acquisition transfer and protection.4 
Acquisition. Animals count as assets with positive economic value, and as 
such are important objects of a system of property law. In the state of nature, 
every animal was a res nullius, that is a thing owned by no person. In contrast to 
a res commune (such as air or water) a res nullius could be reduced to private 
ownership by capture.5 The rule was followed under Roman and English law, 
subject to one fine difference, which went not to the question of whether animals 
could be owned, but only to the question of who owned a particular animal. 
Under Roman Law if A captured land on the property of B, he could keep it;6 
under English law the animal became the property of the owner of the locus in 
quo.7 Once captured, an animal remained the property of its owner until it was 
                                                 
1Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies 158 (1997). The entire 
book offers a rich and powerful explanation of the patterns of domestication that is required 
reading for anyone interested in this subject. 
2Id. 
3Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law 131 (1962). 
4For a general discussion of these principles, see Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a 
Complex World 59-111 (1995); for an earlier philosophical version of the same theme, see Robert 
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 150–53 (1974).. 
5Gaius, Institutes, II, 66.  
6Justinian Digest, 41:  
7See, Blade v. Higgs, 11 H.L. Cases 521, 11 Eng. Rep. 1474 (1865) (adopting the rule of 
ownership ratione soli, or by reason of the land) . 
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 abandoned. An owner did not abandon possession even by sending out animals, 
unsupervised, to graze in the hills or fields,8 so long as the animals had the 
“intention to return” (the so-called animus revertendi) to their original owner, 
which in turn was evidenced by their “habitual” return.9 But if that pattern was 
broken, then the animals were regarded as abandoned and subject to capture by 
another. 
Universally, the owner of the female animal also owned its offspring.10 
That practice follows from the manifest inconvenience of the alternatives. To 
treat the offspring as a res nullius raised the specter that some interloper could 
snatch the newborn from its mother, which could not happen under the 
dominant rule, which eliminated any dangerous gaps in ownership. Nor did it 
make any sense to give the newborn animal to the owner of the land on which 
the birth took place, for that rule would only induce the owner of an animal to 
keep in an animal against its natural inclination, perhaps reducing its changes of 
reproductive success. Nor did it make sense to allocate ownership of the 
offspring jointly to the owners of both the male and female parents, assuming 
that the former was in captivity. It is never easy to identify the father, and even if 
he is known with certainty, a rule of joint ownership rule forces to neighbors into 
an unwanted partnership between relative strangers. Anyone who wants joint 
ownership can contract for it voluntarily. The rule that assigned offspring to the 
mother was treated as a universal proposition of natural law. 
                                                 
8See, e.g. Ulpian 41.2.12.1 “Property has nothing in common with possession.” for discussion, 
Nicholas, Introduction at 110–15. The rule in question has been the source of much philosophical 
discussion, see e.g., Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice 56–73 and the editorial 
explication id. xxxiii, (ed. John Ladd, 1999). 
9Gaius, Institutes, II, 67 (F. De Zulueta ed. 1946). 
10See, e.g., 4 Am. Jur., 2d., Animals, Sec. 10 at, p. 257: “’The general rule, in the absence of an 
agreement to the contrary, is that the offspring or increase of tame or domestic animals belongs 
to the owner of the dam or mother. . . .In this respect the common law follows the civil and is 
founded on the maxim, ‘partus sequitur ventrem’ . . . Furthermore, the increase of the increase, 
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 Transfer. Next, the law had to provide some mechanism to transfer the 
ownership of animals. In the absence of exchange, the value of any animal is 
limited to its use (or consumption) value to its owner. Once exchange is allowed, 
both sides could profit, when animals were sold, given away or used as security 
for loans. Transfers were common once young animals were weaned.   
 In the grand scheme of things, the methods of transfer have at most 
instrumental virtues. The customary mode of transfer is by way of delivery 
either by gift or by sale. In an economy that lacked mechanical or electrical 
sources of power, draught animals were regarded not solely as sources of food, 
but often as capital items on a par with land and slaves.11 While a simple delivery 
might transfer ownership of small or newborn animals, higher levels of formality 
(such as the ritual of mancipatio in Roman law) were routinely used to make 
effective the transfer of more valuable animals.12 
Liability. All legal systems develop elaborate liability rules that set out 
both an owner’s responsibility for the wrongs committed by his animals, and 
likewise the owner’s rights to recover for injuries to his animals.13 The potential 
theories of liability spanned the gamut: one possibility was to hold owners 
vicariously liable for animals that they owned, much as (ancient) owners were 
liable for the torts of their slaves, or (modern) employers are liable for the wrongs 
of their employees committed within the scope of their employment. 
Alternatively, owners could be held liable not for the animal’s act as such, but for 
their own antecedent failure to keep their animals in. In both cases, an extensive 
debate could arise over whether any liability, whether for act or omission, was 
                                                                                                                                  
ad infinitum, of domestic animals comes within the rule and belongs to the owner of the original 
stock.” For application, see, Carruth v. Easterling, 150 So. 2d 852, 854–55 (Miss. 1963) 
11See, e.g. F. H. Lawson, Negligence in Civil Law (1950), at 23, 24, which discusses death or 
injury to “slave or animal” in the same breath. 
12For a description of the formalities, see, Gaius, Institutes, I, 119; for discussion see Nicholas, 
Roman Law, supra note 3, 103–5. 
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 governed by negligence or strict liability principles. Under the so-called 
principles of noxal liability, an owner in some instances could escape further 
liability by surrendering the animal in question—a strategy that made sense 
when the value of the animal was less than the harms so caused. Special rules 
were developed in connection with cattle trespass. On that subject there were 
immense debates (a.k.a. range wars) in arid countries over whether to switch 
from the common law rule that required cattleowners to fence their cattle in to the 
alternative rule that requires landowners, often at enormous expense, to fence 
these animals out.14 Special rules were introduced to allow, without liability, 
minor harm to property beside public roads on which animals traveled. 
Oftentimes the mental states, both of animal and owner were key to 
deciding liability. It could matter whether an animal committed a deliberate or 
accidental harm. It could also matter whether the animal was provoked or 
whether it acted in self-defense against, say, the attack of other animals. 
Sometimes the decisive mental state was that of the owner, not of the animal. 
Thus in Exodus if an ox gored, then it could be put to death, but the owner was 
spared—a variation on the theme of noxal liability. But if the owner had been 
aware of the propensity of the animal to gore, then he could be held liable if he 
did not keep the animal under his control.15 Even when animals could no longer 
                                                                                                                                  
13For a general discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Torts §13.3 (1999). 
14On which see, e.g., Garcia v. Sumrall, 121 P.2d 640 (Ariz. 1942), noting that the switch tends 
to take place on large tracts on barren lend suitable only for grazing, where there is no arable 
land worthy of protection. Yet the presumption generally stays in favor of the common law rule 
of fencing see Kenneth Vogel, “The Coase Theorem and California Animal Trespass Law”, 16 J. 
Legal Stud. 149 (1987). Vogel notes that in a regime in which the landowner is required to fence 
out intruders he can make agricultural use of his property only by contracting with all potential 
interlopers; but when animals must be fenced in, a given owner can allow his land to be used for 
grazing by dealing with only a single individual; for a study of the evolution of these norms in 
Shasta County California, see Robert Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes, 
chs. 2 & 3 (1991).  
15The relevant passages are in Exodus: 
21.28: If an ox gores a man or woman to death, the ox shall be stoned to death, its flesh may 
not be eaten, but the owner of the ox is innocent.  
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 be put to death, the on damages feasant allowed the owner of animals to hold 
them as security for the damage they caused—no questions asked16 In this 
context, liability remained stubbornly strict not because it farmers were oblivious 
to the mental states of animals, but because they understood that this entire self-
help regime would collapse if a landowner could only hold for amends a stray 
that had escaped through its owner’s negligence, which they could not infer 
simply from the presence of the animal.17 The principle of no liability without 
fault made few inroads into this area, even though it received spirited 
philosophical defense.18 The farmers whose interest were intensely practical 
much preferred to retain the more administrable strict liability laws.19 
II. The Moral Status of Animals under the Classical Synthesis 
In shaping these theories of tort liability, neither the ancients nor their 
modern successors committed any obvious blunder of treating animals “just 
like” land or inanimate objects. Nonetheless, that claim has often been advanced. 
As Steven Wise puts the point:  
                                                                                                                                  
21.29. But if the ox was previously reputed to have had the propensity to gore, its owner 
having been so warned, yet he did not keep it under control, so that it then killed a man or a 
woman, the ox shall be stoned to death, and its owner shall be put to death as well. 
21.30. Should a ransom be imposed upon him, however, he shall pay as the redemption of 
his life as much as is assessed upon him. 
The evident sophistication of these passages could not be ignored. 21.28 speaks in terms of a 
strict liability, which leaves open the possibility of defenses based, for example, on provocation, 
but probably not the defense that the owner used all due care to keep the animal in. But once 
there was warning of a dangerous propensity—itself a sophisticated dispositional concept—then 
if the owner did not keep it under control, he could be held liable, unless of course he was able to 
redeem his own life by paying some assessment. One could argue with the wisdom of the rules, 
but cannot impute to those who authored them a lack of the permutations of legal analysis. 
16See, e.g., Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N.J. L. 339(1876) 
17Id. at 341. 
18See Glanville Williams, Liability for Animals (1939). 
19Report of the Committee on the Law of Civil Liability for Damage Done by Animals, CMD 
8746 ¶3 (1953). The explanation was: “This class of liability is of interest only to farmers and 
landowners and the general public are not affected thereby.” The impulse was that any deviation 
from the standard rules of tort law were justified by the reciprocal nature of the interactions 
between the parties in a closed community. See, on reciprocity in tort law generally, George 
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 Although blinded by teleological anthropocentrism, the 
Greeks were not blind. They could see that nonhuman animals 
(and slaves) were not literally “lifeless tools.” They were alive. 
They had senses and could perceive. But Aristotle compared them 
to “automatic puppets.” 
Wise’s use of the term “nonhuman animals” is a nice, but transparent, 
rhetorical ploy to undercut the traditional firm line between human beings (not 
human animals) and (some other kind of) animals. But even if we put that point 
aside, his position is overdrawn. Surely the early legal systems outline above, did 
not make this mistake, given the importance that they attached to the mental 
states of animals as well as people. Nor does it appear that Aristotle made that 
error either. Even a quick peek at his History of Animals shows a subtlety and 
appreciation on this point:  
in a number of animals we observe gentleness or fierceness, 
mildness or cross temper, courage or timidity, fear or confidence, 
high spirit or low cunning, and, with regard to intelligence, 
something equivalent to sagacity. Some of these qualities in man, as 
compared with the corresponding qualities in animals, differ only 
quantitatively: that is to say, a man has more or less of this quality, 
and an animal more or less of some other; other qualities in men are 
represented by analogous and not identical qualities; for instance, 
just as in man we find knowledge, wisdom, and sagacity, so in 
certain animals there exists some other natural potentiality akin to 
these.20 
                                                                                                                                  
Fletcher, “Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory”, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 547-548 (1972), with explicit 
reference to the rules of liability for wild animals. 
20Aristotle, The History of Animals, Book VIII, 588a, (D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson trans. in R. 
McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle, 1942).  
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 None of this sounds remotely like a flattening of animals intellectual or 
emotional states in the manner portrayed by Wise. Of course Aristotle’s 
treatment of animals is marred by his unavoidable ignorance of the rudiments of 
reproduction: he had no microscope, and thus no clue, that sperm differs from 
semen (which in its primary sense still refers to the “fluid” that carries the seed), 
or that the female of the species produce eggs.21 But it does not take a microscope 
to observe and exploit the rudiments of animal behavior for human survival. It is 
well known, for example, that the domestication of all major groups of large 
animals was completed at least two millennia before Aristotle wrote, that is 
between 8000 and 2500 B.C.22 The ancients, no matter how ignorant they were of 
the mechanics of reproduction, knew how to use artificial selection, a.k.a. 
breeding, in order to modify animal and plant species for their own benefit. “. . . 
Darwin, in the Origin of the Species didn’t start with an account of natural 
selection. His first chapter is instead a lengthy account of how our domesticated 
plans and animals arose through artificial selection by humans.”23  
On the issues that matter, then, nothing seems further from the truth than 
Wise’s highly stilted account of how ancient peoples viewed animals. A 
contemporary case for animal rights cannot be premised on the dubious 
assumption that our new understanding of animals justifies a revision of our old 
legal understandings. The ancients may not have known much about the fine 
points of animal behavior and reproduction. Still their understanding of animal 
personality, their understanding dispositions and mental states, their skills in 
domestication, belies the belief that either farmer or jurist, ancient or modern, 
had some difficulty in distinguishing animals from inanimate objects, or for that 
                                                 
21See Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 7211-730 (Arthur Platt trans., id). 
22See, Diamond, Guns, Germs & Steel, supra note 1, at 165. Similar strenuous efforts were 
made for the domestication of plants. Id. at 114–25. 
23Id at 130.  
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 matter from slaves. The key differences could never have been overlooked by 
any person in daily contact with those animals on which their survival 
depended.  
“Survival” is the right word, for nothing less is stake in primitive societies 
that labor under conditions of scarcity when every calorie counts. Animals were 
a source of work in the fields; of food; of protection; and of companionship. They 
received the extensive protection of the law because they were valuable to the 
human beings that owned them. To imagine an ancient society in which animals 
had rights against human beings solely because they were sentient creatures is to 
envision a society in which human beings would be prepared to put themselves 
and their families at risk for sake of brute, if sentient, creatures. The ancients 
devoted considerable ingenuity in determining the proper status of animals, but, 
as far as I can tell, their speculations never denied the agency of animals. Yet at 
no time did they talk themselves into thinking that animals holders of legal 
rights. Those altruistic sentiments are the indulgence of the rich and secure. They 
play no part whatsoever in the formative thinking of any individual or society 
whose bodily or collective security are at risk. Such intellectual developments 
had to wait until, at the earliest the nineteenth century.   
III. The Benefits to Animals of Their Ownership by Humans 
The historical backdrop invites a further inquiry: why is it that anyone 
assumes the human ownership of animals necessarily leads to their suffering, let 
alone their destruction?  Often, quite the opposite is true. Animals that are left to 
their own devices may have no masters; nor do they have any peace. Life in the 
wild leaves them exposed to the elements; to attacks by other animals; to the 
inability to find food or shelter; to accidental injury; and to disease. The expected 
life of animals in the wild need not be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. But 
it is often rugged, and rarely placid and untroubled.  
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 Human ownership changes this natural state animals for the better as well 
as for the worse. Because they use and value animals, owners will spend 
resources for their protection. Veterinary medicine may not be at the level of 
human medicine, but it is only a generation or so behind. When it comes to 
medical care, it’s better to be a sick cat in a middle-class United States household 
than a sick peasant in a third-world country. Private ownership of many pets (or, 
if one must, “companions”) gives them access to food and shelter (and 
sometimes clothing) which creates long lives of ease and comfort. Even death can 
be done in more humane ways than in nature, for any slaughter that spares 
cattle, for example, unnecessary anxiety, tends to improve the amount and 
quality of the meat that is left behind. No one should claim a perfect concurrence 
between the interests of humans and animals: ownership is not tantamount to 
partnership. But by the same token there is no necessary conflict between owners 
and their animals. Over broad areas of human endeavor, the ownership for 
animals worked to their advantage, and not to their detriment. 
IV. Animals as Holders of Rights 
The modern debates over animals go beyond the earlier historical 
arguments by asking whether animals are, or should be treated, as the holders of 
rights against their would-be human masters. In dealing with this debate one 
common move is to exploit the close connection, already noted, between slaves 
and animals in the ancient world. The injustices of owing slaves is said to be 
paralleled by the injustices done to animals. Thus in Rattling the Cage, Steven 
Wise starts with the observation that Aristotle lumped animals with slaves and 
women as beings that were lower than (Greek) males in explicit hierarchy found 
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 in Arthur Lovejoy’s Great Chain of Being.24 He notes that Aristotle observed that 
“the ox is the poor man’s slave.”25 The Romans in his view did no better insofar 
by lumping animals with slaves, women, and insane persons. Now that we have 
repented our errors with slaves and women, let us, Wise urges redress human 
injustices to animals.  
I have several responses to this line of argument. The first rejects the 
asserted, if elusive, historical equation among women, slaves, and animals. Of 
course animals were lumped with (some) human beings for limited purposes. If 
only some human beings had full legal rights, then others had either fewer or 
none, and to that extent were “like” animal. But this gross oversimplification 
does not capture, for example, the full subtleties of the law of “persons” in 
Roman Law or any other ancient legal system. Given the divisions among human 
beings, the law of persons was always more complex in ancient legal systems 
than in modern ones. The Roman rules for men within the power of their fathers 
and for women, and for insane persons all differed from each other in important 
particulars. Men within the power of their father could become heads of their 
own families at the death of their father; they had full rights to participate in 
political life even while consigned to a subordinate position within the family.26 
That subordinate status in turn was softened by the social recognition of the 
separate property—the so-called peculium—with which the paterfamilias would 
not interfere.27 In addition, the manicipation of sons during the life of their father 
was commonplace. Marriage for its part was a consensual union, in which 
formalities were evidentiary and thus not strictly required.28 Animals did not 
                                                 
24Steven Wise, Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals 9 . The reference here is to 
Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (1960). 
25Aristotle Politics, Bk. I, Ch. 2, 1252b 10. 
26See, Nicholas, Introduction at 65, 66 (1962). 
27Id. at 66. 
28Id. 80-82 
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 marry. With a nod toward modernity, the woman, as well as the man, was free to 
renounce the marriage at any time.29 Women, slaves (not to mention sons) and 
animals were each subject to distinct rules tailored to its own distinctive status. 
More to the point, it is critical to note why the older classification of 
persons slowly broke down over time. From Justinian on forward, the basic 
philosophical position held that all men (by which they meant people) by nature 
were born free.30 The use of the words “by nature” carried vital intellectual 
freight about the pre-social status of human beings. Even before Locke, the clear 
implication was that social arrangements should be organized to preserve, not 
undermine, the natural freedom of human beings. Therefore any limitation on 
human freedom within civil society was an evident embarrassment to this 
normative view. But Roman jurists were not reformers. Rather, they were mainly 
chroniclers of their own system, often in the pay of the leaders of a slave society. 
They confined their philosophical reflections to a few grand introductory 
observations. But they never entered into open warfare with the operative rules 
of their own legal system.  
Others of course could appeal to natural law principles to advance 
reformist as well as conservative causes. Faced with sharp rebuke, the defense of 
the status quo ante on slaves and women slowly crumbled precisely because 
they were human beings and not animals. Any defender of full legal capacity for 
some but not all humans had to find some independent reason to justify the 
differential legal status. It is hard to do this with slaves, many of whom were 
acquired by conquest. Is there any one with a straight face who could deny that 
an ingenious slave was smarter than his or her indolent master.  
                                                 
29Id at 81. 
30See Justinian’s Institute, Book I, ch. 2, 2.  
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 It is, in a sense, easier to maintain the line against women because of the 
prominence of sex differences. But in the end this has to fail as well. Aristotle, for 
example, imputed to women a set of inferior characteristics justify their second-
class legal status. But it rings hollow in face of the obvious objection that every 
man is not better than any woman on every (male) dimension that matters. Some 
women are taller than men, stronger than men, smarter than men. Depending on 
your fondness for stereotypes, a majority of women may be more empathetic and 
cooperative than men. Indeed with the passage of time and the progress of 
civilization, warlike skills and brute strength diminish in relative importance, so 
the balance of social advantage shifts to traits in which women have in relative 
abundance. (After all, the grand social contract whereby everyone renounces 
force against everyone else works more to the advantage of women than men.) In 
this environment, no one could defend the strict rank order judgments needed to 
prop up the sharp differences in legal status between men and women.  
None of these categorical differences then work. But there is another 
approach that does make sense, and which in the end prevailed. One great task 
of any legal system is to set out the basic relationships between strangers. Such is 
the function of the “keep off” rules generated by the recognition of universal 
rights to individual autonomy and private property. One does not have to 
endorse either property or autonomy in their entirety to understand their basic 
logic. Coordinating the rights and duties of countless pairs of unrelated 
individuals cannot rest on subtle sliding scales with uncertain substantive 
content. It depends on clear classifications known and observable by all—which 
helps explain why the clear, if unprincipled, classifications based on sex, race and 
slavery were able to function as long as they did. But once the dichotomous view 
of the world—all Xs are better under some metric than all Ys—is rejected, then 
only one social approach makes sense. We adopt the central proposition of 
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 modern liberalism, namely, that all natural persons, that is all human beings, 
should be treated as legal persons, with the full rights to own property, to make 
and enforce contracts, to give legal evidence, to participate in political life, to 
marry and raise families, to engage in common occupations, to worship God, and 
to enjoy the protection of the state when they participate in any of these 
activities.31  
On this view, the great impetus of the reform movement lay in the simple 
fact that the individuals who were consigned to subordinate status had roughly 
the same natural, that is human, capacities as those individuals in a privileged 
legal position. We still think in categories, but now all human beings are in one 
category; animals fall into another. The use of the single word “capacities” 
carries two different meanings and in so doing reflects a profound empirical 
truth. With time, most of the personal limitations on individual capacity 
disappeared, but not without epic struggles over the abolition of slavery, and the 
extension of civil capacity and suffrage to women. But even before the change in 
formal legal status it would be a mistake to assume that slaves were treated like 
women, or that animals were treated like either. The variations in social status 
was just too great. 
The defenders of animal rights place a slightly different twist on this 
history, which seizes on the fact that equal legal capacities are conferred on 
individuals with known differences in talents and abilities. The point requires a 
response. The movement for equal rights of all human beings must take into 
account the fact that all people do not have anything remotely like the same 
cognitive abilities. The phrase ordinary intelligence itself conceals a multitude of 
differences. But even that range does not capture the full extent of the problem, 
                                                 
31For that list, see, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (speaking of liberty as used 
in the context of substantive due process analysis). 
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 even if we put aside the case of children: what fate lies for adult human beings 
whose mental disabilities in fact preclude them from taking advantage of many 
of the rights they are afforded? Our standard position is to give them extra 
protection, not to exterminate them, and to do so because they are human beings, 
entitled to protection as such. 
It follows therefore we should resist any effort to bootstrap legal rights for 
animals on the change in legal rights of women and slaves. There is no next 
logical step to restore parity between animals on the one hand and women and 
slaves on the other. Historically, the elimination, first of slavery and then civil 
disabilities to women occurred long before the current agitation for animal 
rights. What is more, the natural cognitive and emotional limitations of animals, 
even the higher animals, preclude any creation of full parity. What animal can be 
given the right to contract? To testify in court? To vote? To participate in political 
deliberation? To worship?  
None of these make any sense owing to the lack of intrinsic animal 
abilities. The claim for animal rights thus tends to boil down to a singular claim. 
Protection against physical attack, or, perhaps, as Gary Francione as urged a 
somewhat broader right whereby animals cannot be used as resources subject to 
the control of human beings, or, more generally, “the right not to be treated as 
things” or resources, owned by other human beings, even, it appears, when done 
for their benefit.32 The most that can be offered is protection against physical 
attack by human beings, and perhaps by other animals, and perhaps some 
recognition of the limited ownership that animals can acquire over certain 
external things from territories to acorns. A change in legal position yes, but a 
restoration of some imagined parity no. 
                                                 
32Gary L. Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog? xxix, (2000), and at 
50-80. 
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 V. Partial Parity for Animals: Sensation or Cognition? 
So the question now arises, on what grounds ought animals be accorded 
these limited, but real legal, protections against human beings. In essence, there 
are two ways to go. The first emphasis sensation, and the second cognition. Both 
in my view fail to sustain the claim for the new wave of animal rights. 
Start with sensation. Animals experience pleasure and pain and should 
not be made to suffer as the instruments of human satisfaction. The nature of this 
claim exposes at the very least one of the fundamental soft spots in any kind of 
libertarian or utilitarian theory. It is therefore no accident that Robert Nozick, for 
example devotes much thought to the question of animals. His mode of 
argument runs as follows. He first develops the theme that the “moral side 
constraints” that reflect our “separate existences” make it utterly in appropriate 
to conclude that ‘[t]here is no justified sacrifice of some of us for others.”33 This 
insight leads quickly to the libertarian side-constraint against aggression. To 
probe just how powerful that constraint is, Nozick then turns to the moral side 
constraints that should be established in virtue that animals are sentient 
creatures.34 As befitted his darting intelligence, Nozick never quite came down in 
favor of the proposition that animals should be treated with the same respect as 
people, but he was quite emphatic in concluding that they could not be treated as 
mere things either. He thought that a total ban on hunting for pleasure was in 
order, and was doubtful that the case could be made out for eating meat given 
that “eating animals is not necessary for health.”35 But this statement over the 
concern for animal welfare is not a plea for moral parity. The side-constraints 
may exist, but they are not the same side-constraints that apply to human beings.  
                                                 
33Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, supra note at 33. 
34Id at 35–42. 
35Id at 36. 
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 The exact same issues arises within the utilitarian framework. Once again 
start with the view that what ultimately matters are gains and losses, such that 
rights are just a means to secure those social arrangements that maximizes social 
gains (or pleasures) over social losses (or pains). One obvious question is how to 
measure these pleasures and pains. A number of different approaches can be 
taken. The easy way to avoid a comparison across persons is to insist that 
everyone has to be better off in one state of the world than in another. But that 
test for social welfare is so restrictive that it has little use in evaluating ordinary 
arrangements. Alternatively, one could argue that one state of the world is better 
than another if the winners in that state could (in principle, but not in fact) 
compensate the losers for their pain and still come out ahead of where they 
would otherwise be. There are enormous administrative difficulties in sorting all 
this out in setting out human arrangements. But when the dust settles the 
ultimate challenge to the utilitarian is the same as it is to the libertarian. In 
determining the excess of pleasure over pain, who or what deserves a place in 
the overall social utility function? The great challenge for utilitarian theory is 
who ought be counted in the felicific calculus. 
Do animals then deserve a place in the social utility function, whether it is 
constructed on aggregate or individual basis. The test for this right is the capacity 
to suffer and enjoy. Such is the point of Jeremy Bentham’s blunt assertion: “the 
question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?36 Our 
intervention to prevent suffering is, however, usually confined to questions of 
how human beings ought to interact with animals, and there the problems are 
difficult enough. Does one increase or reduce the suffering of animals by 
domestication? How would we know and what would we do with that 
                                                 
36Jeremy Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch XVII, ¶ UV [1781] (1988), at 310, 
quoted in Francione, Animal Rights, at 5. 
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 information if we had it? And if there are any increases in longevity do those 
justify or excuse putting animals to death, after a happy life, for food or medical 
experimentation? As Nozick observes, one common justification for eating 
animals is that human ingenuity brought them into the world in the first place. 
But think of how that argument plays out with human beings. Surely parents are 
not allowed to kill its children at three hours, days, months or years just because 
they gave them the initial gift of life. “[O]nce a person exists, not everything 
compatible with his overall existence, not everything compatible with his overall 
existence being a net plus can done, even by those who created him.”37 Stated 
otherwise, we think of parents as guardians, not owners of their children. The 
parity argument would insist that animals, once brought into this same world, 
receive this same protection. 
Even if we could answer these conundrums, we still face a greater 
challenge: do we have it within our power to arbitrate the differences among 
animals? Do we train the lion to lie down with the lamb, or do we let the lion 
consume the lamb in order to maintain his traditional folkways? Do we ask 
chimpanzees to forgo eating monkeys. It is odd to intervene in nature to forestall 
some deadly encounters, especially if our enforced nonaggression could lead to 
extermination of predator species. But, if animals have rights, then how do we 
avoid making these second-tier judgments? We could argue that animals should 
not be restrained because are not moral agents because they do not have the 
deliberative capacity to tell right from wrong, and therefore cannot be bound by 
rules that they can neither articulate nor criticize nor defend. But at this point we 
must ask whether we could use force in self-defense against such wayward 
creatures or must let them have their way with us, just as they do with other 
animals. In answer to this question, it could be said that animals cannot be held 
                                                 
37Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, at 38 
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 responsible by human standards because of their evident lack of capacity to 
conform.  
Yet there’s the rub! Once that concession is made, then the next question is 
whether we really think that suffering is the only criterion by which rights are 
awarded after all? It does seem troublesome—nothing is fatal in this 
counterintuitive metaphysics—to assume that animals are entitled to limited 
rights on a par with humans while denying that they are moral agents because 
they are incapable of following any universal dictates. And do we attach any 
weight to the unhappy fact that these animals are themselves imprinted 
“specieists,” in that they have instinctively different relationships with members 
of their own kind than they do with members of prey or predator populations? 
The test of sensation cannot generate a clean account of legal rights for animals. 
So what about cognition? In his recent book, Drawing the Line.38 Steven 
Wise advances the claim that limited cognitive capacity supports the claims for 
negative rights—that is, for rights not be used as objects for human advantage. 
These preconditions run as follows. The animal 
1. can desire 
2. can intentionally try to fulfill her desires and 
3. possesses a sense of self sufficiency to allow her to understand, even 
dimly, that it is she who wants something and it is she who wants to get it.39 
He then shows how to greater or lesser extent these criterion are satisfied 
by young children, chimps, bonobos, gorillas, orangutans, dogs, and even 
honeybees. It is no surprise that by these tests, all these animals do fairly well, as 
of course would rats, hyenas and raccoons. Unless an animal has some sense of 
self, he cannot hunt, and he cannot either defend himself or flee when subject to 
                                                 
38Steven M. Wise, Drawing the Line: Science and the Case for Animal Rights (2002). 
39Id. at 32. 
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 attack. Unless he has a desire to live, he will surely die. And unless it has some 
awareness of means and connections, it will fail in all it does. We do not need 
experts to make judgments under these standards. It is quite enough that the 
mother senses danger when a stranger comes between her and her young. That 
happens all the time, and meets, with room to spare, each of the ostensible 
criterion that Wise sets out in his campaign for animal rights.  
 But why follow these tests on the questions of entitlements? At one level 
the entire discussion gets creepy when we make these comparisons organism by 
organism: how do we compare an intelligent chimp with a profoundly retarded 
child? It seems clear that even Wise has to engage in species-like comparisons to 
frame his general inquiry, and to proceed in that matter means that we do not 
draw any real distinctions within any particular animal or human grouping 
however defined. Indeed to move in the other direction invites scorn from all 
quarters: are dumb chimps entitled to no protection? May retarded children be 
killed at will because they will always flunk Wise’s three tests? Or that infants 
may be killed with impunity because they do not yet have higher cognitive 
powers? These variations have little to do with the rights of species. The question 
is how matters fare when we look at humans and chimps of ordinary 
intelligence: show me the chimp that can learn her multiplication tables or do 
crossword puzzles at any age. The actual differences in the higher capacities are 
enormous on a species-to-species comparison. After all, no chimp could ever 
utter a word in defense of its own rights. The individual variations do not matter. 
So long as retarded children have human parents and siblings, they will never be 
regarded as appropriate fodder for indiscriminate slaughter. So with the rules 
and regulations that humans develop to protect chimps, where variations in 
cognitive abilities among chimps would in the end play little role in deciding the 
care treatment that they receive. 
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 The subject provokes still deeper ironies. In part, Steven Wise undertook 
his newer venture because in his earlier work, Rattling the Cage: Towards Legal 
Rights for Animals he sought to establish limited legal rights for chimpanzees, 
only to face the same boundary question among species as everyone else. What 
about lions, tigers, alley cats and jelly fish? None of these can be excluded if the 
capacity for suffering is decisive. Nor ironically can once they are excluded on 
grounds of a (more) limited cognitive capacity under Wise’s new tests. In the 
end, even the proponents of animal rights must adopt an explicit speciest 
approach, complete with arbitrary distinctions. The line between humans and 
chimps is no longer decisive, but then some other line has to be. Perhaps it is the 
line between chimps and great apes, or between both and horses and cows, or 
between horses and cows and snails and fish. Which of these lines are decisive 
and why?. The continuum problem continues to plague any response to the 
universalist claim that suffering of (some) animals counts as much as the 
suffering as a human being—at least to the human beings who are calling the 
shots. It turns out that Lovejoy’s idea of a great chain of being influences not only 
the traditional attitude toward animals but also the revisionists beliefs of Steven 
Wise. 
There is still another easy way to test the asserted parity between human 
beings and animals, even the chimps. Instead of looking at the duties of 
noninterference (by force) with animals, consider the opposite side of the coin—
the affirmative duties that the state owes to animals. It is fashionable today to 
argue that all human beings are entitled to some minimum level of support in 
order to flourish as human beings able to develop their varied capacities. That 
desire for certain minimum rights is intended to impose on some individuals the 
correlative duties to support other people, so as to build a profound and 
enduring set of economic cross-subsidies into the system.  
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 My simple question is this: do we as human beings owe the same level of 
minimum support to chimps, or other animals, that we do to other people? If we 
give Medicare to persons do we have to supply it to chimps in the wild, at least if 
they are in our territory? Or suppose that we manufacture limited supplies of a 
new pill that is a cure for some disease that is ravaging both human and 
chimpanzee populations. There is not enough to go around for both man and 
beast. Is there some kind of affirmative duty to assist chimps to the same extent 
that we assist other human beings? I should be stunned if any real world 
scenario would ever produce any result other than humans first, chimps second. 
The blunt point is that we have, and will continue to have different moral 
obligations to our own conspecifics than we do to chimps or members of any 
other species.  
This point is in some degree challenged by Gary Francione who asks 
whether “we cannot prefer human over animals in situations of true emergencies 
or conflicts.”40 As the subtitle of his recent book indicates, “Your Child or the 
Dog?”, the moment of truth comes when an individual should choose to save his 
child or his dog if both are trapped inside a burning house? The child, darn it, 
even if the child is unrelated and the dog is one’s own. Francione waffles about 
this point, by noting that rescuers have to make similar choices among human 
beings. Should the rescuer save the infant who has yet to live his life over the 
very old adult who is near death? But this does not preclude a judgment that 
saves any human being over any animal. Nor would the reluctance to prefer the 
old and infirm over the young and healthy make it proper to treat old people as 
slaves, or unwilling objects of medical experimentation. The same of course can 
be said of animals. It seems preferable to rescue a trapped animal than to remove 
a chair or a bush. But a priceless painting? All these comparisons only show that 
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 rankings are possible, with more or less precision. Animals are not treated just as 
though they were inanimate objects. Yet that hardly establishes that they are 
entitled to (limited) treatment as human beings.  
VI. Where Now? 
At this point, the question does arise, what ought to be the correct legal 
regimes with respect to animals? Here it would be simply insane to insist that 
animals should be treated like inanimate objects. The level of human concern for 
animals, in the abstract, makes this position morally abhorrent to most people, 
even those who have no truck whatsoever with the animal rights movement. 
That concern, moreover, can manifest itself in perfectly sensible ways short of the 
animal rights position which don’t go quite as far as Nozick’s anxious concern. It 
is of course pretty straightforward to pass and enforce a general statute that 
forbids cruelty to animals.  Even if cruelty is narrowly defined so as to exclude, 
as it routinely does, the killing of animals for human consumption, at least it 
blocks some truly egregious practices without any real human gain, gory lust to 
one side. We can also engage in humane (note the choice of word) practices for 
the killing of animals so as to reduce their anxiety and fear. There are doubtless 
many ways to reduce animal suffering without compromising human 
satisfactions, or indeed improving the human condition, and adopting those 
should count as important priorities. Who can oppose measures that benefit 
humans and animals alike?  
The harder question arises when there is a trade-off between human gain 
and animal suffering. But actions that fit that description are, and have long 
been, staples of human society. Taking the first easy steps to protect animals still 
allows for the domestication and ownership of animals, and their use as human 
                                                                                                                                  
40Francione, Animal Rights, at xxx. 
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 food. Nor do these address what is perhaps the hottest topic of controversy, the 
use of animals for medical experimentation. But that practice, with some 
important caveats, continue. It goes without saying that the use of animals for 
medical experimentation counts as a prima facie bad. We should not choose to 
inflict it lightly on any animals for some ephemeral gain. But that is a far cry 
from saying that no human benefit will ever justify in human terms the killing of 
animals, given their right to bodily integrity. That per se approach will not 
succeed; nor should it.  
Examples are easy to state. Let it be shown that the only way to develop 
an AIDS vaccine that would save thousands of lives is through painful or lethal 
tests on chimpanzees. People will clamor for that test (if they had the certainty 
announced here). Other cases are even easier. Suppose that the shortage of 
human kidneys could be at long last eliminated by the genetic engineering of pig 
kidneys so as to overcome the risk of human rejection? Does anyone think that 
we would impose a per se ban on the use of those organs in human beings 
because of the devotion to animal rights? Right now we have enormous 
safeguards, excessive in my view, on the use of human organs for 
transplantation.41 Even after death the practice is hard to implement. Efforts to 
persuade a reluctant nation to allow for voluntary transfers of organs for cash 
have fallen largely on deaf ears. Systems of voluntary donations have not picked 
up the slack. The use of animal organs represents the hope of thousands of 
individuals for future salvation. An animal right to bodily integrity would stop 
that movement in its tracks. It will not happen, and it should not happen. 
So what then should be done once we, as humans, decide not to extend 
something akin to Mill’s categorical harm principle to animals, so as to leave 
them outside the orbit of any and all human uses. Lots, I suspect. For starters, we 
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 can recognize that in dealing with animals, there are two dimensions in which it 
is necessary to strive for the appropriate balance. The first of these is with the 
hierarchy of animals. The blunt truth, as Wise’s own work shows, is that the 
more animals look and act like human beings, the greater the level of protection 
that we as humans are willing to afford them. Rights of bodily integrity do not 
have much of a future for mosquitoes. Second, the higher the species ranks on 
own tree of life, the stronger the justifications that must be advanced in order to 
harm members of that species. Cost aside, we would be wholly inappropriate to 
think that we should capture or breed chimpanzees for food, whatever our views 
on their use for medical experimentation. Conversely, it would be wholly 
inappropriate to think that we could only justify the sacrifice of cattle for medical 
experimentation, given their common use as food. 
All that said, human beings have to think hard about the proper treatment 
of animals and to regulate, as we have long done, our interactions with animals. 
In sensing our way to the proper balance, we should take into account 
improvements in technology that lessen our dependence on particular uses of 
animals, and we should be alert for ways in which we could improve their lot 
without damaging our own (at least very much). It is all too the good if we could 
check the irritations that shampoo causes to the eye without animal 
experimentation. But here we have to fight and refight a thousand small 
skirmishes without the benefit of any categorical rules for guidance. Yet 
notwithstanding the mushiness of the method, we will probably do better as a 
human society than we would do by invoking any categorical rule that says that 
animals, or some animals, rank so high that we can do nothing to compromise 
their bodily integrity for human ends. I am tempted to call this a Kantian like 
absolutism, but such would be false to Kant whose own views on animals (or 
                                                                                                                                  
41See, Richard A. Epstein, Mortal Peril: Our Inalienable Right to Health Care? (1997).  
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 Vieh, i.e. dumb animals) were wholly dismissive of their position in the legal 
firmament given their inability to act as rational agents capable of acting in 
accordance with some universal law. Nonetheless, the animal rights advocates 
show the same stubborn insistence about the inviolable position of animals that 
Kant defended in dealing with human beings. I do not think that the Kantian 
counsel of perfection is capable of being consistently followed in human affairs, 
however lofty the ideal. But for animals, my fear is that this borrowed, if 
Kantian-like, absolute cannot be maintained against the objections to it. Yet 
mounting this heroic campaign is likely to divert our attention from the smaller 
improvements that can and should be made in our dealing with animals: just 
how do we deal with foot and mouth disease? With exponential growth in 
alligator or deer populations? With hunting and the common pool? 
No matter what adjustments we make, this enterprise that will always 
touch an raw nerve. The root of our discontent is that in the end we have to 
separate ourselves from (the rest of) nature from which we evolved. Unhappily 
but insistently, the “collective” we is prepared to do just that. Such is our lot, and 
perhaps our desire, as human beings.  
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